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Abstract 
 This paper aims at studying the consequences of the Agency Theory 
application at the case of the Italian Revenue Agency (afterwards IRA). 
The major countries in the world entrust the tax administration to the 
Agencies that make use of various strategies to manage tax revenue and to 
contrast tax avoidance. 
In the last years the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (afterwards OECD) has invited many States to increase the tax 
compliance between Public Tax Administration and Taxpayers and to 
improve the relationship with these. 
There are more scientific contributions about the themes like the Agency 
Theory, the Stakeholder’s Theory and other more on Governance and 
Accountability policies: many of these will be discussed in this work. 
In the light of these observations the research question is: given that IRA 
plays a central role in the tax administration, what happen if we apply the 
Agency Theory on this? What are the Agency costs in this case? 
To answer to these question we have studied the Law provisions in the 
Italian tax field and the “way to do” of the IRA. 
So, this work not is only a theoretical analysis of the scientific literature but 
it move to analyse the implications of these on the real case.  
The conclusions achieved in this paper are based on the analysis of the 
Italian case that only partially brings a solution to this question. 
However it represent the first point for us to beginning a future comparison 
between the evidences in the international context.  
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Introduction 
 The international discussion about the relationship between the 
Public Administration and the Taxpayer is increased in sensitive way in the 
last years: many players, in the international context, have made their 
opinions and thoughts about this theme (OECD, 2013). 
 Maybe the most important, it is the search result made by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (afterwards 
OECD) exposed in the Paper “Tax Administration Comparative Information 
Series 2013” (Paris, 2013). 
 In this is underlined that it is very important, for Agencies in the 
different countries, to introduce in its operative actions “selected aspects of 
strategic management” and to focalize on the theme  “human resource 
management and tax administration”. 
 It’s not unusual that many Public governments use terms as 
“management” or “human resource management” within its administration. 
  Among the 1980, indeed, many public organizations have adopted 
the New Public Management’s approach for which the governments leave its 
old way to manage and adopt this new way, new “vision”, to operate. 
 The term “New Public Management” it’s utilized by C. Hood (1991) 
to explain the policy’s target to modernize the public sector to make it into 
an organization more effective. 
 In this perspective, they are utilized logics typical for the private 
sector as “efficacy”, “efficiency” and others. 
 Therefore, in the public context, it was necessary to create a series of 
entities that have autonomy compared to the government and, for this reason, 
were born the Agencies: the clear aim was to separate the “political” 
perspective from the “operational” perspective. 
 Around this issue C. Hood asserts that the “ focus on public  service 
production functions and operational issues contrasted with the focus  on  
public  accountability,  ‘model  employer’ public service values, ‘due 
process,’ and what happens inside  public  organizations  in  conventional  
public administration” (C. Hood, 2001, p. 12556) 
 The New Public Management and its evolution, in fact, introduce 
within the Public Administration the “way to doing” used, historically, in the 
private companies. Unavoidably, were born a lot of implications about the 
“ownership structure” in the relationship between citizen and policy makers. 
 Implications about the Governance of these new organizations – it’s 
important to underline that they are private organization that pursue a public 
interest – and its agency costs. 
 Indeed, towards a theoretical analysis of the different scientific 
literature we discover that the policies of accountability and transparency’s 
actions represent a bonding cost for the Tax Authorities. 
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Methodological notes 
 We consider the close relationships that exist in the scientific 
literature between some theories that up to now not be considered together. 
 This analysis in fact moves to put light the theoretical implications 
that arise if we consider at the same time these theories. 
 So, we think that often the major contribution brought by the 
scientific search is “to give name” to facts, situations, relations and a lot of 
things that before are unknown. 
 In this search, we analyse the following themes and theories (reported 
Tab.1) towards its major authors that had treated the matter: 
Tab. 1: Analysis of literature 
THEMES CONSIDERED CONSIDERATIONS PRINCIPAL AUTHORS TREATED 
New Public Management 
and its evolution 
The evolution of Public 
Administration and the 
approach towards the citizen 
have the central role in this 
analysis and explain why 
some tasks are entrusted to 
the Agencies in the Public 
context 
C. Hood (1995, 2001) 
M. Haque (2009) 
W.J. M. Kickert (2001) 
A.G. Larbi (1999) 
W. MC Court (2013) 
A. G. Nhema (2015) 
J.S.T. Quah (2013) 
M. Robinson (2015) 
The theory of the Agency 
and the Agency costs 
The theory of the Agency 
explain the dynamics of the 
behaviour of the various 
parties here considered 
M.C. Jensen (1972, 1983)  
W. Meckling (1972) 
F.M. Fama (1983) 
R. Freeman (1988) 
Accountability Policies and 
Transparency’s Action in the 
Public context 
The evolution of the Public 
Administration’s approach 
towards citizens gave birth to 
needs of accountability and 
transparency’s actions 
W. Norman (2004) 
J. Heath (2004) 
M. J. Ferris (1998) 
A. E. Graddy (1998) 
J. Amstrong (2001) 
F. Biermann (2011) 
A. Gupta (2011) 
 
International Taxation Law, 
Trust and Tax Compliance 
The implications by the 
change of the approach in the 
Public Administration have 
consequences in the tax 
law’s field 
OECD (2010, 2013, 2014) 
J. Stiglitz (2012) 
J.I. Krueger (2013) 
L.P. Feld (2007) 
B.S. Frey (2007) 
Source: Our elaboration  
 
 In this way we analyse the implications through the wide view of the 
themes treated here to demonstrate that the accountability and transparency’s 
policies arise to contrast (or to improve) the “contractual nature” of the 
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The implications apported in the puclic context by the new public 
management and its evolution 
 Many in the scientific literature that studied management and 
organization affirm that their theories are applicable indifferently to both 
public and private sectors (Kickert, 2001). 
 This is one of the issues for which in the 1980s was born the New 
Public Management Theory. 
 Indeed, the historical partition between private and public entities it 
was exceeded with the advent of the hybrid organization like agencies, 
public companies and other (Will 1975,Blair 1995,Perri and Kreamer 1985). 
 On this theme Kickert asserts, “In recent decades, the importance of 
an intermediate realm has been greatly increased by the retreat of the 
welfare state. Many Western (Europe) governments have moved away from 
direct delivery of a variety of public services. They have privatized or 
otherwise divested them-selves of these functions, in some cases 
transforming the agencies that performed them into hybrid organizations. 
These organizations are expected to function like businesses: to be efficient, 
customer driven, and client oriented. Yet, they perform tasks that are 
inherently public. In other words, they are supposed to act as if they were 
situated in the private sphere, while at the same time remain within the 
public sphere” (Kickert, 2001, p. 136). 
 Appear clearly the features of this new approach that many States 
have provided in their law system: efficacy, efficient and customer oriented 
(Larbi, 1999). 
 An important question is: what are the needs for which was theorized 
this new approach? 
 There are many theories on this but the most conventional explains 
that the combination of the crisis on one hand and the neo-liberal ideas, on 
the other, pushed to implementation of change’s politics. 
 These affirmations are supported by the thoughts of Larbi that says: 
“NPM reforms have been driven by a combination of economic, social, 
political and technological factors. A common feature of countries going 
down the NPM route has been the experience of economic and fiscal crises, 
which triggered the quest for efficiency and for ways to cut the cost of 
delivering public services. The crisis of the welfare state led to questions 
about the role and institutional character of the state” (Larbi, 1999, p. 4). 
 The change in new forms of organization and the different way to 
think the relationship with citizens are fundamental elements in the 
transaction “old-new” form of management. 
 The citizen take place a central role in the strategies of the many 
Countries, not only the OECD countries but also those in developing (Mc 
Court, 2013, Morse, 1992, Harvey, 2009). 
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 However, it is very important to underline “a discrepancy between 
the trust of public sector reform efforts in developing country contexts and 
wider shifts in the nature of governance and contemporary approaches to 
public management grounded in OECD experience”. (Robinson M., 2015 p. 
4). 
 To understand this evolution of different approaches about the 
management of the Public Administration is good take shape summarily this 
simple path: from Old Public Administration (since 1970s) to New Public 
Management (since 1980s) and to New Public Management to New Public 
Service. This path had its roots into the Max Weber’s thought: in fact, in his 
conception of administration, based principally on the bureaucratic model, 
Weber thinks six principals features (Nhema, 2015): 
• Hierarchy of authority according to which: the system of organization 
was oriented in a strong “top-down” way; 
• Division of labour: is important, in this conception, cut division of 
labour to employ specialised experts in each specific position; 
• Impersonality: the consideration about the political choices must be 
without personal consideration; 
• Technical qualification: it is favoured the technical qualification 
against arbitrary dismissal; 
• Procedural specification: in this perspective is fundamental the 
explication and codification of the rules 
• Continuity: anyone who wants to pursue a career within the 
organization can do it. 
 So, these features have influenced strongly the path of evolution in 
the Public Administration way to manage and to organize its activities.  
 The Old Public Administration, in 1970s, emphasizes some features 
of the Weberian Model (McCourt 2013, Minogue 2001): it was a system 
centralized, controlled in the hierarchical way and thought with rules and 
guidelines that provided the largely of the actions within the organization. 
 In this perspective “public servants serve public rather than private 
interest” (Robinson M., 2015). 
 After the Old Public Administration, called also “command and 
control” model, it has come to the New Public Management in 1980s. 
 It was emerged specially in OECD countries, as already mentioned 
before, after then increasing as reaction to the inability of the Old Public 
Administration to respond to the citizen needs in the same way efficacy and 
efficiency which has the market (Hood, 2001) 
 The switch between the different approaches is here: in the sensibility 
of the promoters of the New Public Management to achieve the presence of 
the citizen’s needs in its strategies. 
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 They’re many empiric evidences about the political success into the 
countries where the New Public Management had taken place: for example, 
the Singapore’s model, that it’s unique of a kind (Quah, 2013). 
 Singapore is the singular case where there is a close relationship 
between citizen and politics, relationship founded on mutual trust: in 
according to the prevailing literature, this situation is difficult to repeat. 
 In particular, this model of organization is characterized by these 
features (Quah, 2013):  
• Reform of the Singapore Civil Service; 
• Strong and enforceable anticorruption measures; 
• Decentralization of the Public Service Commission; 
• Payment of competitive market salaries to attract and retain the 
candidates in the public service. 
 Is very interest, about this, the words of Haque that says: “Another 
concern emerging from these current changes in governance based of 
organizational disaggregation (e.g. autonomous agencies), use of multiple 
stakeholders (private, non-government, and foreign), and expansion of 
budget autonomy, is the potential barrier to the realization of public 
accountability due to the growing difficulty to coordinate, manage, and 
monitor these new structures and institutional arrangements. In this regard, 
the optimistic aspects of the Singapore case are its highly capable state to 
steer the situation and its relatively small public sector (due to small 
population) that is more easily manageable” (Hacque, 2009, p. 13). 
 The New Public Management evolves in the New Public Service 
(some researchers have considerate also an intermediate phase called New 
Public Governance) (Robinson, 2015). 
 The concept that “the public role of servants is to help citizens” is the 
key of interpretation of this approach. 
 Furthermore, in this there isn’t the self-interest of public 
management. 
 The figure of citizen is change: this isn’t a client or a customer where 
the relationship is configured in a top-down way (McCourt 2013, Hood 
1995). In fact, theory of democracy and participation of citizens to the public 
administration are new imperatives in this vision: the relationship is 
configured as bottom-up (Greenawalt, 2016, Cropf, 2016). 
 There are more implications derived by an approach configured in 
this way: the role of the citizen in a bottom-up organization provides the 
possibility to re-think the way to participate of these in the public life.  
 The policy maker include the citizen interest in the process of 
decision making, plan the strategic view in according to its needs. 
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 Therefore, in this last perspective, there is surely discretion of the 
government actions but driven by the constrictions derived by the 
monitoring’s citizen control. 
 This path is excellently summary by McCourt (2013) in the Tab. 2. 
 There are surely more considerations about these observations: at 
first is useful, for research purposes, observe that in the Public 
Management’s evolution the citizen has changed its role within the layout of 
State’s structure. 
Tab. 2.: The evolution of the Public Administration approach in according to McCourt 
(2013): public service reform problems and approaches 
Source: Elaboration reported in M. Robinson (2015) p. 5 
 
 The empowerment of citizen, its participation in the public life and its 
involvement in the public interest decision are the guidelines that move the 
new “way to do” in the good Public Administration (McCourt, 2013). 
 Furthermore, another important observation: it’s obvious that this 
evolution take place in different way in each country, in according to the 
historical features of these. 
 It’s empirical evidence, the challenges that the globalization and the 
open markets have led are hard and submit not little difficulties (Abony and 
Van Slyke, 2010). 
 The new technologies have the capacity to orientate the actions of the 
government to create alternative form of participation. 
 In fact, in according to the principles of transparency and the public 
access, the new technologies provides the opportunity to “bringing citizen 
closer to police making process through new and improved channel of 
participation as well as citizen monitoring of government” (Avila, 
Feigenblatt, Heacock, Heller, 2011, p. 4). 
 Problem Approach Main action 
period 
1 How can we put government on 
an orderly efficient footing?  





2 How can we get government 
closer to the grassroots? 
Decentralization 1970s to present 
3 How can we make government 
more affordable? 
Pay and employment 
reform 
1980s and 1990s  
4 How can we make government 
perform better and deliver on 
our key objectives? 
New Public Management  1990s to present  




1990s to present 
6 How can we make government 
more responsive to citizens? 
“Bottom-up” reforms Late 1990s to 
present 
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 In the second paragraph of this work we analyse the influence of this 
new approach within the tax field in Italy in according to the conclusions 
reached by the application of the M.C. Jensen and W. Meckling’s “theory of 
principal-agent” to IRA. 
 Summary, to close this part, it’s important understand the path’s 
evolution of the logics in which the citizen it was thought (Denhardt and 
Denhard, 2000):  
• as a client and constituent in the Old Public Administration based on 
the Political theory; 
• as a customer in the New Public Management based on the Economic 
and Positivist theory; 
• as a citizen in the New Public Service based on Democratic theory. 
 Surley, we agree with Gyong J.E. that affirms: “Good governance no 
doubt is absolutely necessary for the achievement of social political and 
economic progress in any society. It is the means through which the State 
can effectively address the allocation and management of resources to 
enable it respond to the collective good of society without discrimination. 
Failure to give country good governance can result to widespread 
corruption and abuse of due process. The results are lack of accountability 
and widespread poverty of the vast majority, thus making them vulnerable to 
easy manipulation and exploitation by the elite” (Gyong J.E., 2014, p. 88). 
 
Agency theory and agency costs to italian revenue agency 
 Maybe the most important scientific contribution in the field is the 
article published by M.C. Jensen and W. Meckling in 1976: “Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Cost and Ownership structure”. 
 In according to the Authors, there is a close relationship between the 
ownership structure and the behaviour of the Managers or of the Owners. 
 Yet in the first part of their script, they assert that the “analysis casts 
new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional 
and popular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of 
ownership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the 
definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an 
optimal capital structure, the specification of the content of credit 
agreements, the theory of organizations, and the supply side of the 
completeness of markets problems” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 2). 
 Now, for what concerns here, is important underline the essence of 
this theory: the model “Principal-Agent” and the theory of the Agency costs. 
 The Authors define the relationship between the Principal and the 
Agent as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
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which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 6). 
 From this idea derives a series of consequence sentences: for 
example, what happens if both parties, Principal and Agent, maximize their 
interests and their utilities? 
 Exist a clear “interest conflict” because, affirm the Authors, “there is 
a good reason to believe that the Agent will not always act in the best 
interest of principal” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 6). 
 Furthermore, surely there are different ways to limit this contrast as 
incentives granted by the Principal to Agent with the aim to restrict unseemly 
actions for it. 
 In the light of this assumption, appear clearly that to smooth the 
divergences born by the interest conflict, arise some costs held by Principal 
and Agent. 
 Therefore the Authors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) theorized the 
presence of three major types of costs emerged by this interaction: 
- the monitoring expenditures by the Principal; 
- the bonding expenditures by the Agent; 
- the residual loss. 
 There are, then, others phenomena as the Hazard Moral and the 
Adverse Selective every time that the Agent has more information compared 
to the Principal and has the opportunity to use this Asymmetry Information 
to procure itself an advantage. 
 Now, after the focus placed on the Agency costs, we analyse the 
implications derived by the ownership structure in relation with Agency 
costs. 
  There is a correlation between the number of owners and their 
influence on the Agent: the structure of the ownership determines the 
capacity of the Principal to control the Agent. 
  The empirical evidence shows that in the companies where there are 
a lot of shareholders there are higher Agency costs rather then where there 
are few shareholders (Scarpa, 2009). 
 So, for this reason, the Agency costs increase where there is a wide 
separation between ownership and control. 
 The conclusions of the M.C. Jensen and W. Meckling’s script affect, 
surely, also the Public Administration that in the last years have adopted the 
New Public Management or New Public Service approaches. 
 For what concerns this work, in the light of the search reasons 
exposed in the abstract, it’s possible to apply the model “Principal-Agent” to 
the Italian Revenue Agency. 
 The first issue is to understand: who is the Principal in the paradigm 
Principal-Agent here?  
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 In according to the previous definitions, established that the Italian 
Revenue Agency is the Agent, exist two perspectives, internal and external, 
that define two different Principal. 
 On one hand, in internal perspective, there is the Minister of 
Economics and Finance and, on the other hand, in external perspective, there 
is the taxpayer and, in general, the citizen. 
 In the Public sector, in fact, it’s possible to have “multiple principals” 
because the Agent has some relationship between different interlocutors 
(Ferris, Graddy, 1988). 
 The Authors assert: “A perplexing dimension of public sector 
applications of principal agent theory is the existence of multiple principals. 
Moe (1984) has suggested that government is a serial set of principal agent 
relationships with citizens as ultimate principal (e.g., citizens and their 
representatives; representatives and the executive branch; and superior-
subordinate relationship within the bureaucracy)” (Ferris and Graddy, 1988, 
p. 6). 
 So, here we consider only two principal relationships: in the next 
paragraph we will show, brief, the internal perspective and then, in analytical 
way, the external perspective. 
 In the external perspective – in according with what reported in the 
previous paragraph – we show how the policies of accountability required by 
New Public Management approach represent bonding expenditures in the 
paradigm Principal-Agent. 
  
Internal perspective: principal as minister of economics and finance 
 As shows in Figure 3., there are two typical Agency costs deriving by 
the relationship between the Minister of Economics and Finance and the 
Italian Revenue Agency: the Monitoring Expenditures for the first and the 
Bonding Expenditures for the second. 
 The Italian Revenue Agency enjoys its own autonomy and operates 
with their goals to manage the tax system and to contrast the tax avoidance. 
 So, the best way to reach the goals, in the logics of the New Public 
Management, is operate in according to the forms of organizations that allow 
achieving the best result. 
 Therefore, the Minister needs to receive a series of information to 
understand if the behaviour of this Agent (IRA) was been correct. 
 Thus, this information is not only utilized to create performance 
indicators but it has the task of demonstrating the quality of his operations. 
 So, in respect of the recommendations by OECD, the Italian 
Government provides a set of indicators that shows how the Italian Revenue 
Agency should increase the Tax Revenue not only counteracting tax 
European Scientific Journal December 2016 edition vol.12, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
11 
avoidance but also amplifying the Tax Compliance and the spontaneous 
fulfilment. 
 
Figure 3: Minister of Economics and Finance and Italian Revenue Agency in the Theory of 
Agency’s perspective  
Source: Our elaboration 
 
 In the last years, in fact, the major countries in the world, focalizes its 
attention on the right of the taxpayer: why? 
 In their famous research paper the OECD explains the difference 
between “Enhanced Relationship concept” and “Co-operative compliance”, 
affirming that need to pass from the first to the second. 
 The OECD affirms: “When in 2008 the Study into the Role of Tax 
Intermediaries defined the collaborative, trust-based relationship based on 
the pillars listed above, the name “enhanced relationship” was chosen as a 
term that properly distinguished this approach from an obligation-based 
basic relationship. (…) The term “enhanced relationship” has also raised 
questions about the nature of the approach and may have given rise to 
connotations of inequality in tax treatment. In short, large corporate 
taxpayers and revenue bodies, while they are satisfied that the principles on 
which the approach is based remain sound, are concerned that the name 
“enhanced relationship” has given rise to misunderstandings and in some 
cases suspicion that the concept violates important principles, such as 
equality before the law”. (OECD, 2013, p. 14): 
 Maybe the answer to the question “why the Tax Intermediaries use 
methods to operate with connotations of inequality in tax treatment?” is: the 
various intermediaries, Agencies or similar, have great autonomy to manage 
the tax system. 
 Furthermore, when there is defined clearly the goal but not the 
principles to achieve it, is possible that the Agent distorts the way to achieve 
its goal and misunderstands the aim of its actions. 
 In this perspective, therefore, takes a fundamental role the Principal’s 
actions of control, (in this case the Italian Minister of Economics and 
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Finance) that mustn’t only control the fairness and correctness of the 
operations of the IRA but must address it towards a fair way to achieve its 
goals. 
 In few words, is fundamental that the Minister sets clearly the 
“strategic and political view”. 
 As an example, to understand if the IRA increase the Tax Revenue 
deriving higher Tax Compliance, the Italian Government provides a series of 
indicators in the law D. Lgs. 157/2015 and specify in the Agreement between 
the IRA and Minister of the Economics and Finance 2015-2017 (Provided by 
the article 59, part 2, 3 and 4 of the D. Lgs. 30/1999), reported in Tab. 4: 









Indicator of Customer Satisfaction  
Signed agreements for dispensing services  
Number of telephone responses offered by CAM or by small call centre 
Number of responses in written form (as sms, web-mail) 
Actual detail data referred to the indicators that make up the “Barometer of the 
service’s quality”, “Percentage of the cadastral update acts and avoided 




Number of tax declaration “Unico PF” transmitted the channel “Fiscoonline” / 
Total Number of tax declaration “Unico PF” 
Number of tax declaration “Unico PF” transmitted by the taxpayer 
Number of communications sent by 31/12/2015 compared to the tax declarations 
“Unico 2013” received  
Number of communications sent by 31/12/2015 compared to the tax declarations 
“Unico 2014” received 
Percentage of the communication of irregularity annulled  
KPI 3 Number of acts of practises (circular and resolution) and operative instructions 
provided in relation to the interpretation activity of tax law 
Source: Our adaptation by Italian version reported in the Agreement between the IRA and 
Minister of the Economics and Finance 2015-2017, pg. 10 of enclosure 4. 
 
 In this Box there are three principal KPIs referred to the strategic area 
of services. 
 Every KPI dishes out to understand “the quality” of the relationship 
between IRA and Taxpayers. 
 Trough a comparison between these indicators and the evidence of 
increasing or decreasing of Tax Revenue will be possible understand if the 
major revenue deriving by a better compliance or not. 
 Surely, in the paradigm Principal-Agent, to gather these information 
and to elaborate means more Agency costs (or transitions costs), so like 
asserts by Ferris and Graddy: “Thus, such arrangements, which are often 
pursued for efficiency gains (reduced production costs) may require 
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significant transaction costs in order to ensure public accountability)” 
(Ferris and Graddy, 1988, p. 2). 
 It is unavoidable and these costs represent an investment to have 
higher performance in the future (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 To endorse this thought are lighting these words: “The dilemma for 
the national governments is how to develop fiscal strategies that reduce the 
ability of lower-level governments to thwarts its goals, taking into account 
its own objectives, the information requirements (i.e. transactions costs), and 
subnational governance capacity. Two key strategies are subsidies (e.g. 
intergovernmental grants) and regulations (e.g. funded mandates). The 
informational needs, and thus transactions costs, required to implement 
these strategies differ” (Ferris and Graddy, 1988, p. 8). 
 In the light of this assumptions, it’s possible analyse the second 
perspective, here said “external”, where to role of Principal is assigned to the 
Citizen. 
  
External perspective: principal as citizen or taxpayer 
 In the Figure 5 it’s possible observe the structure of the relationship 
between the Citizens and the IRA. 
 The number of Principals, in this case, is very wide: as explained in 
the first part of this work, when the number of principals is high the Agency 
costs increase and the capacity of the Principals to smooth the asymmetry 
information is very low (Meier and Bohte, 2003). Every citizen (or taxpayer) 
has no much bargaining power (only the little red arrow in the figure) while 
the IRA has the possibility to implement mechanism of communication 
whereby demonstrate “the quality” of its operations. 
Figure 5: Citizen (or Taxpayer) and Italian Revenue Agency in the Theory of Agency’s 
perspective  
Source: Our elaboration 
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 It’s clear that, here, the Agents (every single agent of the IRA) have 
the opportunity to benefit exploiting the asymmetry information: the risk of 
the corruption’s phenomena is obvious. 
 Just now takes more sense the thoughts of Rahaman, Liberman, 
Giedraitis and Akhter: “NPM system contrasted with the focus on public 
accountability, ‘model employer’ public service values, ‘due process,’ and 
what happens inside public organizations in conventional public 
administration” (Rahaman, Liberman, Giedraitis and Akhter, 2013, p. 298). 
 So, to smooth these divergences the OECD explains that every tax 
intermediaries must change their “way to doing” for which there aren’t 
different treatment towards taxpayers and citizens in general (OECD, 2013). 
 Why it’s fundamental this change? Why, in this particular period of 
history, OECD and the major countries focalize its attention on tax 
compliance?  
 In the last years, after the events post financial crisis, the citizens 
have lost the truth in the governments and, more in general, in the 
government system. 
 J. Stiglitz (2012) explains that the financial crisis had generated a 
deep distrust of institutions (private and public) and this fact will lead to a 
global recession. 
 To avoid the mistrust the companies and the public governments have 
incorporated in its strategy more importance to the external communication 
and, in particular, towards the stakeholders (Castellini, 2007). 
 There are a lot of contributions on the “Stakeholder Theory” (Phillips 
et al, 2003) as “theory as organization management and ethics” for which the 
company or the Agency, in this case, must have the knowledge of every 
interest of their stakeholders and inserts this information within its strategy. 
 There is, maybe, an “advanced” form of accountability where the aim 
is not only to “account” what was done but it’s to involve the stakeholders in 
the definition of the strategic plan. 
 There is a close relationship between “Stakeholder Theory” and 
“New Public Service” and both theories had influenced hardly the actual 
management of Public Administration and Private Companies. 
  
Accountability policies of ira as bonding costs 
 Why the “Accountability” policies represents, in the external 
perspective, the bonding costs for the IRA? 
 The OECD asserts “People are generally comfortable with being 
accountable for things they can control” (OECD, 2014, p. 30) and this is the 
start point to explain because the “accountability policies” represent bonding 
costs. 
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 In the definition of the bonding cost we understand that it’s incurred 
by the Agent to assurance the Principal on the “quality” of its actions (that 
the behaviour of Agent is coherent with the expectations of Principal) 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 For this reason, across the accountability policies the IRA has the 
opportunity to show their results to citizen in according with the New Public 
Service approach. 
 In this sense the provisions of the law D. Lgs. 157/2015, yet treated 
before, represent the clear aim of the government to put the citizen in the 
decision-making-process. 
 Now, it’s fundamental clarify what means “accountability”. 
 We agree with the thought of Biermann and Gupta that affirm: “In 
essence, accountability has four elements: (1) a normative element, that is, a 
standard of behaviour defined with sufficient precision; (2) a relational 
element, linking those who are held accountable to those who have the right 
to hold to account; (3) a decision element, that is, a judgment of those actors 
who may hold other actors accountable about whether the expected standard 
of behaviour has been met; and finally (4) a behavioural element that allows 
the governing actor to sanction deviant behaviour of those held accountable. 
All elements need to be present in sufficient degree to make any 
accountability relationship meaningful”. (Biermann and Gupta, 2011, p. 
1857) 
 Relating this assumption at the case here analysed, it’s possible 
affirm that: 
• Normative element: there are a series of the provisions like the 
OECD guidelines, the European Union Recommendations and finally, in 
Italy surely the most important in this case, the Law D. Lgs. 157/2015 and 
the set of performance indicators provided by the Agreement between the 
IRA and Minister of the Economics and Finance 2015-2017. 
 It’s important specify that these are only provisions in tax field but 
there are others Public Administration’s reforms that move in this sense 
(here not treated); 
• The relation element: it is represented by the link between IRA and 
taxpayer, where the taxpayer have the opportunity to control the actions of 
IRA; 
• The decision element: the capacity of the IRA to increase the tax 
compliance, improved actions that including the taxpayer in its decision-
making process; 
• The behavioural element: this is represented by the level of tax 
avoidance because the incapacity of the IRA to increase the tax compliance 
or to contrast tax avoidance with control system leads the taxpayer to do this 
behaviour. 
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 In the light of these assumptions, it’s possible qualify the strategy of 
IRA to increase the tax compliance like a politics of accountability and 
transparency’s actions. 
 Indeed, the management of tax system in Italy is undergoing sensitive 
change, driven by the guidelines of OECD and the tax strategies of the 
principal world’s Economics. 
 So, clarified this point, it’s important to underline that these bonding 
costs represent surely a relevant investment in term of resources (scarce for 
definition) but it is necessary to achieve the objectives yet described. 
 Indeed, this investment (a real cost) is the key to beginning a process 
of change and to increase the tax compliance and the spontaneous fulfilment. 
 The OECD, in its publication of 2014s, focuses its attention on the 
theme of accountability, as reported in the following Figure 6. 
 In the paper “Measurement of Tax Compliance Outcomes – A 
Practical Guide”  (OECD, 2014, p. 81) it is explained the TADAT (Tax 
Administration Assessment Tool) that “provides an objective and 
standardised performance assessment of a country’s system of tax 
administration”.  
Figure 6: Performance Outcomes Area in according to the Tax Administration Assessment 
Tool 
Source: Elaboration of T.A.D.A.T. 
 
 This tool represents an instrument for an international community 
and it is supported by European Commission, Germany, Japan, Netherland, 
Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the World Bank (through the 
International Monetary Fund and its Secretariat). 
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 In the Table 7 we report the set of indicators provided in the area 
“Accountability and Transparency”.  
 To conclude this part of work, it’s important to focus our attention on 
the communication’s strategies incurred by IRA. 
Tab. 7: KPIs on the Transparency and Accountability’s actions in according to the Tax 
Administration Assessment Tool  
The tax administration is transparent in the conduct of its activities and accountable to the 
government and community 
P9 – 25 Internal assurance mechanisms  -Assurance provided by internal audit 
-Staff integrity assurance mechanism 
P9 – 26 External oversight of the tax 
administration 
-The extent of independent external oversight 
of the tax administration’s operations and 
financial performance 
-The investigation process for suspected 
wrongdoing and maladministration 
P9 – 27 Public perception of integrity  -The mechanism of monitoring public 
confidence in the tax administration 
P9 – 28 Publication of activities, results, 
and plans 
-The extent to which the financial and 
operational performance of the tax 
administration is made public, and the 
timeliness of publication 
-The extent to which the tax administration’s 
future directions and plans are made public, 
and the timeliness of publication 
 Source: Elaboration of T.A.D.A.T. 
 
It’s relevant the communication’s strategies in the external 
perspective because across these the Citizen have the opportunity to 
understand the new approach of the IRA and have the possibility to change 
its behaviour, increasing the tax compliance. 
Indeed, the external communication is a strong opportunity for the 
IRA to orientate the perception of the taxpayer towards a principle of 
equality and parity. 
 
Conclusion 
 The analysis conducted in this work shows in that way it’s possible 
apply the theory of the paradigm Principal-Agent to the Italian Revenue 
Agency and explains the existence of two perspectives (in the concept of the 
“multiple principals”): internal and external. 
 There is a close relationship between these two perspectives: 
- In the internal, the Principal is the Minister of Economics and 
Finance that has a wide span of control compared to the IRA. 
 It is very important to define clearly the Strategy Plan whereby it will 
be possible to smooth the divergences deriving by the asymmetry 
information.  
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 We think that in the planning phase it’s desirable that participate 
together and in closely both Top managements (Minister and IRA) to 
understand in which way set up the Strategic Plan, defining objectives and 
performance to achieve these. 
- In the external, the Principal is the Citizen that has a low span of 
control compared to the IRA. 
 In order to implement the key recommendations of the OCED and 
increase the tax compliance, it’s really fundamental beginning with a strong 
politics of accountability where the citizens are in the centre of the 
objectives. 
 The politics of accountability represent a crucial investment and have 
the central role in the IRA’s Strategic view. 
 The Agency Theory shows as it’s impossible to the IRA remove this 
cost but at the same time, this bonding cost and the accountability’s politics 
represent a grate opportunity of change. 
 The joint vision of these perspectives gives the opportunity to 
orientate the behaviours of IRA towards a better way to do, increasing the 
spontaneous fulfilment by taxpayers. 
 Furthermore, to confirm this, there is a wide international scientific 
literature (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al, 1997; Donaldson, Preston, 1999) 
that studied the importance of the stakeholder in the strategic planning and 
had theorized the Stakeholder Theory. 
 More contributes focalized its attention to: 
- Define and classify the different types of Stakeholders; 
- Demonstrate the ethic’s role rather then strategic recognized to the 
Stakeholders; 
- Identify the way whereby the Stakeholders legitimate own 
operations. 
 In the tax field, in the opinion of the writers, is relevant to take a 
particular focus on the last point. 
 Indeed, is essential understand the needs of the citizens and taxpayers 
and plan (in the strategic way) the actions to satisfy these needs. 
 The OECD identifies, in its work, the features that can help the 
Agencies to implement mechanism of “co-operative compliance”: 
“Changing from a “traditional” control approach to a co-operative 
compliance approach in many cases is the result of the development of a 
compliance risk management strategy. The rationale for relationships of this 
kind is to create a joint approach to improving tax risk management and 
overall tax compliance, with benefits for both parties. In response to the 
survey almost all countries responded that the co-operative compliance 
model with large corporate taxpayers is part of a wider (compliance) 
strategy‟. The overall conclusion is that co-operative compliance models are 
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firmly rooted in the overall (compliance) strategy of the revenue body” 
(OECD, 2013, p. 28). 
 The taxpayers have expressed their needs of disclosure and 
transparency and they see the “co-operative compliance” as “Transparency 
in exchange for certainty”. 
 To observe the needs of taxpayer, citizen or a stakeholder in general 
is useful to introduce an analysis of customer satisfaction (Ugolini  
Baldassari, 2010). 
 We endorse the words of Temizel M.: “It has been admitted that the 
relationship between state and society has changed from a control and 
hierarchy mecanism into a network governance where the society as a whole 
share decision making process in some way. The governance reform has 
been described as set of values such as; accountability, transparency, 
participation and foreseeability which meet citizens‘ expectations and 
requirements and help the state to increase good performance displaying 
capacity” (Itemize M., 2015, p. 224). 
 In conclusion, we believe that in this a particular period of the history 
characterized by uncertainly and lack legitimacy, the best strategy for the 
IRA is smooth the divergences born by the contractual relationships and 
increase its legitimation following a political of accountability in according 
to a new strategy (utilizing the stakeholder’s approach). 
 The policies of accountability and the transparency’s actions 
represent, in according to the contractual relationship between the parties, a 
bonding costs: this not be eliminated but at the same time represent an 
opportunity to achieve the change. 
 The application of these reflections and its empirical evidences are 
left to others future studies or to anyone with an interest in this theme. 
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